In this Release, we are using "independent director" to refer to a director who is not an "interested person" of the fund, as defined by the Act. See section 2(a)(19) of the Act [15 U.S.C. 80a-2(a)(19)]. 4 See Adopting Release, supra note 2.
5
Chamber of Commerce v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 412 F.3d 133 (D.C. Cir. 2005 
II. DISCUSSION
The 75 percent condition and the independent chair condition have been extensively discussed in the prior Commission releases, 10 and commenters are referred to the discussion in those releases for a detailed treatment of them. The Commission requests comment on the costs associated with the two conditions, and suggestions for additional provisions designed to achieve the underlying purpose of the amendments, which is the protection of funds and fund shareholders.
The Court found the Commission's discussion of costs, together with an expressed expectation that these costs would be "minimal," to be inadequate. To address this, the Commission particularly seeks reliable cost data in support of commenters' assertions.
For example, in the Remand Release we attempted to identify all of the potential costs associated with the 75 percent and independent chair conditions when we assigned an estimate of direct and indirect costs to each of them; we seek comment on all of these and any other potential costs. In addition, while the Remand Release acknowledged that these costs would likely vary 7 5 U.S.C. 553(c). depending upon which of various methods funds chose to come into compliance with the conditions, such as whether a fund came into compliance with the 75 percent condition as a result of the resignation of one or more interested directors or the selection of one or more new independent directors, 11 the Court was critical of the fact that we based those estimates in part on data from an industry survey that was not a part of the rulemaking record. We specifically solicit comment, therefore, on the adequacy of those estimates and on other appropriate measures of costs.
The Court directed our attention to gaps in the rulemaking record. We now solicit comment regarding current cost data, including such items as implementation data for funds that have voluntarily complied with either or both of the conditions. We also request comment on any other costs that funds may incur, in coming into compliance with the two conditions, that
were not identified in the Remand Release. We are particularly interested in the costs incurred by small fund groups.
12
With respect to the 75 percent condition, we request comment generally on both the monetary and non-monetary costs that funds experienced specifically relating to compliance.
11
In the Adopting Release we estimated that approximately 60 percent of funds met the 75 percent condition at the time we adopted the rule. Adopting Release, supra note 2, at n.78. Of those that subsequently came into compliance, our staff estimates that, based upon filings made with the Commission during the last year, 49 percent did so solely as a result of one or more interested directors resigning from the board of directors, and 14 percent did so solely as a result of adding one or more independent directors. Thirty-seven percent of funds coming into compliance with the 75 percent condition experienced a change in the composition of their boards as a result of (i) the addition of independent directors and the resignation or retirement of interested directors, (ii) the resignation or retirement of both independent and interested directors, or (iii) the addition of both independent and interested directors. to an individual fund of the independent chair condition to derive principally from the increased compensation for the independent chair and the costs of additional staff, without allowing sufficient comment on these matters. Are there other costs that should be taken into account?
Are there better sources of information than those upon which the Commission relied?
Comment on costs may be made on an industry-wide basis or on an individual fund basis.
Comments that are accompanied by supporting data and analysis are of greatest assistance.
15
Finally, we note that the underlying purpose of the two conditions was, and remains, the protection of funds and fund shareholders, and that, as we have been reminded by the Court, we 13 Our staff estimates that, based upon filings made with the Commission during the last year, 54 percent of funds that came into compliance with the 75 percent condition solicited a shareholder vote to elect directors.
14 See Adopting Release, supra note 2, at n.81. Our staff estimates, based upon filings made with the Commission during the last year, 97 percent of newly selected independent chairmen were selected from among the incumbent independent directors.
The Commission considers costs in connection with its obligations under section 2(c) of the Investment Company Act, which requires the Commission, when engaging in rulemaking that requires it to consider or determine whether an action is necessary or appropriate in the public interest, to consider whether the action will promote efficiency, competition, and capital formation. See 15 U.S.C. 80a-2(c). We solicit comment on any other aspect of the conditions that would affect this consideration.
